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Abstract
We propose a signaling model in which the central bank and ﬁrms receive infor-
mation on cost-push shocks independently from each other. If the ﬁrms’ signals
are rather unlikely to be informative, central banks should remain silent about
their own private signals. If, however, ﬁrms are suﬃciently likely to be informed,
it is socially desirable for the central bank to reveal its private information. By
doing so, the central bank eliminates the distortions stemming from the signaling
incentives under opacity. Our model may also explain the recent trend towards
more transparency in monetary policy.
Keywords: signaling games, transparency, monetary policy, central banks, com-
munication.
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tions.1 Introduction
During the last two decades, central banks’ communication practices have changed
dramatically. While traditionally central banks were wrapped in mystery and withheld
information about their policies, their assessment of the economy, details of decision-
making and the goals of monetary policy, they have gradually become substantially
more open. In 1987, the then chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan,
took pride in being secretive: “Since I’ve become a central banker,” he noted, “I’ve
learned to mumble with great incoherence.”1 Nowadays such a statement would be
unthinkable. For example, the present chairman Ben Bernanke called the “increased
openness” of monetary policy makers a “welcome development” in 2007.2
This paper presents a simple model with a central bank that receives private informa-
tion about cost-push shocks. We also introduce the plausible assumption that ﬁrms
may receive information through sources that are independent of the central bank.
Using this framework, we address the question whether the publication of the central
bank’s private information on cost-push shocks is socially desirable. We show that
withholding the central bank’s information aﬀects welfare through two channels.
First, while it is individually optimal for ﬁrms to respond to cost-push shocks, respond-
ing to these shocks is detrimental to aggregate welfare.3 Consequently, information
about cost-push shocks is socially harmful. By withholding such information, central
banks may eliminate its socially harmful consequences for output and inﬂation if the
ﬁrms have received no independent information about the shock.
Second, even if the central bank does not publish its private information and the
ﬁrms do not receive independent information about the shock, the ﬁrms may infer
some information by observing the monetary policy conducted by the central bank.
Consequently, the central bank not only has to consider the direct impact of its action
on price setters, it also has to take into account the eﬀect that its action has on their
1Wall Street Journal, September 22, 1987.
2“Federal Reserve Communications”, speech delivered at the Cato Institute 25th Annual Monetary
Conference, Washington, D.C. November 14, 2007.
3We will discuss this point in more detail in Section 2.
2expectations about the shock. Due to this eﬀect, opacity reduces the central bank’s
ﬂexibility in stabilizing shocks.4
On balance, we show that the aggregate consequences for welfare of both eﬀects de-
pend on the probability of ﬁrms receiving independent information. First, if there is a
low likelihood of ﬁrms receiving independent information, opacity is socially desirable
because it reduces the detrimental economic eﬀects caused by cost-push shocks. The
central bank can achieve this by pursuing a passive policy, thus safeguarding the se-
crecy of its information. Second, for a suﬃciently high probability of ﬁrms’ receiving
independent information, the central bank would not remain inactive if it were opaque.
As the central bank will thus reveal its information anyway, transparency is socially
desirable because it removes the restraint imposed by the link between the central
bank’s actions and the ﬁrms’ expectations under opacity.
Our paper may also shed some light on the observation that central banks have become
more transparent. With the constant progress of information technologies, the precision
of ﬁrms’ direct information is likely to have been improving over time. This trend may
have made transparency in monetary policy more attractive.
Our paper contributes to two strands of the literature. First, it is part of the litera-
ture on signaling games, which goes back to Spence (1973). In monetary economics,
signaling games have been studied by Gersbach and Hahn (2007, 2009), Sibert (2002,
2003, 2009), and Vickers (1986). In our paper, the public will attempt to infer the
central bank’s private information about economic shocks from monetary policy action
if the central bank keeps this information secret. This eﬀect has been neglected in most
publications on central-bank transparency,5 which represent the second strand of the
literature to which this paper contributes.
Second, our paper thus complements the general literature on transparency in monetary
policy as surveyed by Geraats (2002), Hahn (2002), and Blinder et al. (2008). This
4This ﬁnding is in contrast to Jensen (2002), who ﬁnds that transparency may be a “policy-
distorting straitjacket.”
5A notable exception is Sibert (2009). In her two-period model, the central bank has an incentive to
boost output by creating surprise inﬂation. The public may infer the central bank’s private information
about its goals and the temporary eﬀectiveness of surprise inﬂation from a noisy signal of the central
bank’s action.
3literature considers the economic eﬀects of central-bank communication as well as the
consequences that the publication of private central-bank information has for welfare.6
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) show that central banks may prefer some degree of
ambiguity about monetary control in order to be able to surprise the public at a time
when this is most valuable to them. This framework has been modiﬁed to allow for
normative analysis (see Lewis (1991)) and for an explicit distinction of control-error
variance and the degree of transparency (Faust and Svensson (2001)). Applying a
New Keynesian speciﬁcation of the Phillips curve, Jensen studies the desirability of
transparency with regard to the central bank’s control error (Jensen (2002)) and private
information about cost-push shocks (Jensen (2000)). In Jensen (2000), transparency
about cost-push shocks only has an impact on how precisely price-setters can infer the
central bank’s output target. In our paper, transparency aﬀects the ﬁrms’ estimate
of the current shock, which directly aﬀects their assessment of the optimal price they
should charge. In contrast to the existing literature, we focus on the important role of
ﬁrms’ independent sources of information.
Our paper is organized as follows: In the next section we outline the model. In sections
3 and 4 we derive the equilibria under transparency and opacity, respectively. We
compare welfare under both transparency regimes in Section 5. The robustness of our
results is considered in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
We consider a signaling game with a central bank (the sender) and a multitude of ﬁrms
(receivers). Each ﬁrm’s optimal price, p∗, is given by
p
∗ = p + αy + ε
′, (1)
6In a much-cited paper, Morris and Shin (2002) show that transparency may be socially harmful if
agents ﬁnd it individually optimal to coordinate their actions and if this coordination is not socially
desirable per se. However, Svensson (2006) convincingly argues that the range of parameters for which
this result holds is unlikely to be relevant in practice. Cf. also Morris et al. (2006).
4where p is the aggregate price level, y is the (log) output gap, α a positive parameter,
and ε′ represents a shock (more on this later).7 This pricing equation is frequently used
in the literature and can be derived from a microeconomic model with monopolistically
competitive ﬁrms.8
It is crucial to discuss the nature of the shock ε′. If shocks to the Phillips curve
leave the diﬀerence between the natural and the eﬃcient level of output invariant, no
tradeoﬀ will arise between stabilizing output and inﬂation (see Blanchard and Gal´ ı
(2007)). Consequently, the central bank will be able to achieve the socially optimal
solution by pursuing a policy of strict inﬂation stabilization. However, according to
Blanchard and Gal´ ı (2007), there is a wide-spread consensus that such a policy is
undesirable, which led these authors to coin the term “divine coincidence” for shocks
with the aforementioned characteristics.9 In line with the consensus view, there is an
abundance of models of monetary policy with a tradeoﬀ between inﬂation stabilization
and output stabilization.10
Consequently, we consider cost-push shocks, which violate the “divine coincidence”
and create a tradeoﬀ between stabilizing output and inﬂation. For our purposes, these
shocks have one important property: it is individually but not collectively optimal for
economic agents to respond to them. In this sense, information about cost-push shocks
is socially harmful in the hands of price-setters.
How can these shocks be justiﬁed on theoretical grounds? First, they can be associated
with variations in markups. Markup shocks can be modeled by a stochastic sales tax
on all goods, where revenues are used to ﬁnance lump-sum transfers to the agents.11
Markup shocks can also be motivated by changes in the intensity of competition or
7We normalize (log) natural output to zero and thus use the terms “output” and “output gap”
interchangeably.
8See Woodford (2003), among others.
9See also King (1997), who has coined the derogatory term “inﬂation nutter” for a central banker
who is exclusively concerned about inﬂation stabilization.
10This includes classic papers like Rogoﬀ (1985). Models with “cost-push shocks” also have this
property; among them are Clarida et al. (1999), Clarida et al. (2002), Steinsson (2003), Woodford
(2003), and Ball et al. (2005).
11For a discussion of markup shocks see Ball et al. (2005), among others. Compare also the extensive
discussion in Woodford (2002), pp. 44-45.
5in the aggressiveness of wage bargainers. Second, alternative approaches to modeling
shocks that violate the “divine coincidence” have been presented by Blanchard and
Gal´ ı (2007) and Blanchard and Gal´ ı (2008).
In order to keep the model tractable, we assume that only four realizations of the shock
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H (2ρH +2ρL = 1). Thus the shock distribution is symmetric. The
restriction to a discrete set of possible shocks enables us not only to derive analytical
results for separating equilibria but also to study the existence of pooling equilibria and
semi-separating equilibria, where some types of central banks pool, while others choose
a policy that perfectly reveals their type. By contrast, most analyses of signaling games
in monetary economics are restricted to separating equilibria (see, for example, Sibert
(2009)).
The central bank and the ﬁrms independently receive signals about the shock real-
ization. The central bank receives a signal that reveals the state of the world with
probability pCB (0 ≤ pCB ≤ 1). With the complementary probability, the central
bank obtains no signal. Similarly, all ﬁrms jointly receive a signal that reveals ε with
probability pF. Otherwise they receive no signal.
The central bank chooses its instrument m (log money growth), which aﬀects output
via a quantity equation:
y = m − p (2)
Prices are sticky to some extent, which we model by assuming that only a fraction λ
(0 < λ < 1) of ﬁrms can adjust their prices upon observing the central bank’s decision
and possibly their signals.13 The other ﬁrms cannot adjust their prices and are assumed
to inherit a price from the beginning of the period.
12The mechanisms identiﬁed in this paper are likely also to hold for other shock distributions, as
we will argue in Section 6.
13This assumption has been introduced by Calvo (1983).
6Alternatively, our model can be re-interpreted as a model of sticky information rather
than sticky prices.14 Then λ would correspond to the fraction of ﬁrms updating their
information about ε′ and m. The remaining ﬁrms would remain ignorant of ε′ and m,
so they would not change their prices.
The sequence of events is as follows:
• All ﬁrms choose their default prices. Without loss of generality, we assume that
all ﬁrms choose a (log) default price of 0.
• Nature draws the shock ε′.
• The central bank becomes informed about the shock realization with probability
pCB.
• Under opacity, the central bank’s signal is kept private. Under transparency, the
signal is published.
• The central bank chooses its instrument m. This choice is publicly observable.15
• All ﬁrms obtain precise information on the shock with probability pF. With the
complementary probability, all ﬁrms remain ignorant of the shock.
• A fraction λ of all ﬁrms may re-adjust their prices. The other ﬁrms keep their
default prices.
• Output is realized.
In line with other papers that study signaling games in monetary economics, we do
not study an inﬁnite-horizon model (see, for example, Sibert (2009)). This keeps our
framework analytically tractable. We note that our results are driven by the distortions
14Sticky information as an alternative to price stickiness has been proposed by Mankiw and Reis
(2002).
15In principle, one could also consider the case where the central bank’s instrument is kept secret.
For example, the Federal Reserve did not make its policy directive public immediately after the board
meetings (see Goodfriend (1986)). However, the central bank’s instrument, usually a short-term
interest rate, can easily be observed. Therefore it is implausible that monetary policy makers can
keep their choices of instrument secret for any considerable length of time.
7created by the central bank’s signaling incentives under opacity. It is plausible that
these distortions would also occur in a variant of our model with multiple periods.
The equilibrium price level as a function of m can now be obtained by inserting y =
m−p into (1), applying the expectations operator with respect to the ﬁrms’ information
set (EF), and using p = λEF[p∗]:
p = λ(p + α(m − p) + EF[ε
′]) (3)
Solving for p yields
p =
λ
1 − λ(1 − α)
(αm + EF[ε
′]). (4)
With the help of σ := (λα)/(1 − λ(1 − α)) and ε := λ/(1 − λ(1 − α))ε′, p can be
rewritten as
p = σm + EF[ε]. (5)
We note that the price level is identical to inﬂation (π) in our model because we have
normalized the default price level to zero. Consequently, we obtain
π = σm + EF[ε]. (6)
It is crucial to note that EF[ε] is determined by the ﬁrms’ signal, if they have received
one. If they have received no signal, EF[ε] depends on the central bank’s information
under transparency and on the central bank’s choice of m under opacity.
There exist ﬁve types of central banks. Four types correspond to the diﬀerent pos-
sible signals. The ﬁfth type is a central bank that has not received a signal. We
will use 0 denote this type. As a consequence the set of possible types is T :=
{−H,−L,0,+L,+H}. This notation enables us to introduce normalized values for
the shock realization in a compact manner: eτ := [λ/(1 − λ(1 − α))]e′
τ ∀τ ∈ T \ {0}.










where a ≥ 0 is a parameter that measures the importance of the output target. Com-
pared to the more standard formulation L = π2 + ay2, we have normalized losses by
8the factor 1
1+a. Obviously, this does not aﬀect our ﬁndings; however, it will simplify
the analysis.16








((1 − σ)m − EF[ε])
2. (8)
Importantly, the central bank could always achieve zero losses by choosing m = 0 if the
ﬁrms’ expectations concerning the cost-push shock were zero. By contrast, the central
bank can never achieve zero losses when ﬁrms’ expectations are diﬀerent from zero.
Thus information about cost-push shocks is socially harmful.
3 Transparency
In this section we focus on the transparency scenario, i.e. if the central bank has
received a signal, then it makes its information public.
In the following, we derive the optimal policy chosen by the diﬀerent types of central
bank under transparency. For types in T \ {0}, we obtain EF[ε] = ε. It is straightfor-
ward to prove that (8) can be rewritten in the following way:
L(m,EF[ε]) =
a
(1 + a)(σ2 + a(1 − σ)2)
(EF[ε])
2 +










a − σ(1 + a)
σ2 + a(1 − σ)2EF[ε]. (10)
Variable mT
EF [ε] can be interpreted as the optimal value of m, conditional on the fact
that the ﬁrms’ beliefs about ε are given by EF[ε]. With slight abuse of notation we will
sometimes write mT
τ for mT
EF[ε] evaluated at EF[ε] = eτ (τ ∈ T ). Then mT
τ represents
the optimal choices of central banks τ ∈ T \ {0} under transparency.
For a − σ(1 + a) > 0, mT
EF [ε] is a strictly monotonically increasing function of EF[ε].
For a − σ(1 + a) < 0, it is strictly monotonically decreasing. This observation is
important, as we will draw an analogy under opacity and impose monotonicity as a
16The loss function can be derived from microeconomic foundations (see Woodford (2002)).
9restriction on the equilibria. To simplify the exposition, we exclude the knife-edge case
a − σ(1 + a) = 0 for the remainder of the paper.
It then remains to derive the optimal policy of an uninformed type τ = 0. EF[ε] may
take ﬁve diﬀerent values from this central bank’s perspective, namely −eH, −eL, 0, eL,
eH, depending on whether the ﬁrms receive a signal about the shock and, if so, which
realization they observe. Hence an uninformed central bank chooses m to minimize its
expected losses
L0 :=pF [ρLL(m,−eL) + ρLL(m,+eL) + ρHL(m,−eH) + ρHL(m,+eH)]
+ (1 − pF)L(m,0).
Importantly, L(m,−eL)+L(m,+eL), L(m,−eH)+L(m,+eH), and L(m,0) are quadratic
functions of m with minima at m = 0. As a consequence, the optimal policy of an
uninformed central bank under transparency is given by mT
0 := 0.
We summarize our observations in the following proposition:
Proposition 1
Under transparency a unique equilibrium exists. Each central bank of type τ ∈ T
chooses mT
τ .
In this equilibrium each central bank chooses m so as to optimally trade oﬀ the eﬀect of
the shock on output and inﬂation. Because ﬁrms receive direct information about the
central bank’s signal, the central bank does not have to care about its choice aﬀecting
the ﬁrms’ estimate of the shock.
4 Opacity
Under opacity, the ﬁrms do not receive the central bank’s signal directly. However,
upon observing the central bank’s choice of money growth, they may update their
estimate of the central bank’s type.
With probability pF, ﬁrms learn the correct realization of ε because they receive in-
formation independently of the central bank. With probability 1 − pF they obtain no
10independent signal and attempt to infer the central bank’s information from the cen-
tral bank’s choice of money growth m. We introduce f(m) to denote the ﬁrms’ beliefs
about ε, given that they have observed m and have received no signal. Obviously, f(m)
must be a function that satisﬁes −eH ≤ f(m) ≤ eH ∀m. Under opacity, the model thus
corresponds to a signaling game. This makes the analysis substantially more complex
over and against transparency. To simplify the analysis, we focus on perfect Bayesian
Nash equilibria in pure strategies that satisfy two additional, plausible assumptions.
First, we impose a monotonicity requirement on f(m), as will be detailed in the fol-
lowing. Imposing monotonicity is intuitive, given that under transparency the central
bank’s choice of m is a monotonic function of its estimate about the shock. Un-
der transparency, the equilibrium value of m is an increasing function of ECB[ε] for
a − σ(1 + a) > 0 and a decreasing function for a − σ(1 + a) < 0. Hence we assume
that ﬁrms beliefs under opacity are a monotonic function of m. In particular, we pos-
tulate that f(m) is weakly increasing for a − σ(1 + a) > 0 and weakly decreasing for
a − σ(1 + a) < 0.
Second, we assume that f(m) is an odd function, i.e. f(m) = −f(−m) ∀m. This
is plausible because of the model’s linear-quadratic nature. Under transparency, for
example, the central bank’s optimal choice of m is also an odd function of the central
bank’s estimate about the shock.
These assumptions have several important implications. First, ﬁrms expect the shock
to be zero if they have not observed an independent signal and the central bank has
chosen m = 0. Formally, this can be stated as f(0) = 0. Second, and consequently, a
central bank of type 0 will always choose m = 0. Third, the equilibrium choices of all
types T are a weakly monotonic function of the central bank’s estimate of the shock.
Formally, this implies mO
−H ≤ mO
−L ≤ mO
0 = 0 ≤ mO
+L ≤ mO




0 = 0 ≥ mO
+L ≥ mO
+H for a − σ(1 + a) < 0, using mO
τ to denote type
τ’s equilibrium choice of m under opacity (τ ∈ T ).17
17The third consequence of our assumptions can be easily explained. Suppose, for example, a −
σ(1+a) > 0. Then f(m) ≥ 0 ∀m > 0 because f(0) = 0 and f(m) is weakly monotonically increasing.
A central bank that has observed a positive shock would never choose a negative money growth rate
m < 0 because −m > 0 would yield lower losses, which is readily veriﬁed with the help of (8). As a







(σ2 + a(1 − σ)2)(1 + a)
. (11)




(a − σ(1 + a))2
(σ2 + a(1 − σ)2)(1 + a)
> 0.
Hence one can conclude 0 ≤ p∗
F < 1.18
We are now in a position to describe the equilibria under opacity. In Appendix A we
prove an important proposition:
Proposition 2
For pF < p∗
F, a unique19 equilibrium exists. In this equilibrium, all types of central
banks τ ∈ T choose m = 0. If they have not received direct information about ε, the
ﬁrms’ beliefs about the shock are f(0) = 0. For a − σ(1 + a) > 0, f(m) = eH ∀m > 0
and f(m) = −eH ∀m < 0. For a−σ(1+a) < 0, f(m) = −eH ∀m > 0 and f(m) = +eH
∀m < 0.
The proof is given in Appendix A. Intuitively, if the chances of the ﬁrms receiving
information directly are rather low, it is proﬁtable for the central bank to remain
completely passive. As the ﬁrms are unlikely to learn about the shock, the expected
losses incurred by not stabilizing the shock are low. Importantly, by not responding to
its own private information, the central bank can prevent the ﬁrms from inferring this
information.
For pF > p∗
F, no unique equilibrium exists in general. In the following we will charac-








consequence, H and L choose positive values of m. Analogously, −H and −L choose negative values
of m. Monotonicity of f(m) then requires mH ≥ mL (otherwise the ﬁrms’ beliefs would be incorrect).
In a similar vein, m−H ≤ m−L follows from the monotonicity of f(m).
18Recall that we have excluded the knife-edge case a − σ(1 + a) = 0.
19To be more precise, the equilibrium is unique in the sense that no additional equilibrium exists in
which the equilibrium choices for the ﬁve central bank types T are diﬀerent. However, the equilibrium
is not unique with respect to out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
12it is possible to describe the circumstances under which the same outcome as under
transparency can prevail under opacity:
Proposition 3
If and only if pF ≥ ˆ pF, there is an equilibrium under opacity in which all types of
central bankers τ ∈ T choose the money growth rates they would ﬁnd optimal under
transparency (mT
τ ).
For the proof, see Appendix B. Intuitively, for high values of pF the ﬁrms are likely to
be informed about the shock directly. As a consequence, it is optimal for the central
bank to behave in the same manner as under transparency.
We note that ˆ pF < 1. Thus the range of values of pF for which the fully separating
equilibria described in Proposition 3 exist is always non-empty.
Additionally, we note that ˆ pF > p∗
F. Consequently, for the interval p∗
F < pF < ˆ pF nei-
ther pooling equilibria, which are described in Proposition 2, nor separating equilibria
with the same choices as under transparency exist. Intuitively, separating equilibria
with the same choices as under transparency do not exist, as there would be strong
incentives for central banks of type H to mimic L. By mimicking the L-type, type H
can reduce the ﬁrms’ expectations about the shock, which leads to lower losses if the
ﬁrms do not receive an independent signal. However, if H could successfully mimic L,
this would be harmful to L as the ﬁrms might mistake it for H. This, in turn, would
lead to high losses due to the ﬁrms’ beliefs that the shock is very large. Thus type L
tends to choose an m farther away from mT
H in order to make mimicking more costly
for H.
One example of such behavior is given in the following proposition, proven in Ap-
pendix C:
Proposition 4
There is a critical value for pF, denoted by   pF, such that the following semi-separating
equilibrium exists under opacity for pF ∈ [p∗
F,   pF]. Central banks of types τ ∈
{−L,0,+L} choose m = 0. Central banks of types τ ∈ {−H,+H} choose mT
τ . If
ﬁrms have not received direct information about ε, their beliefs about the shock are
13f(0) = 0. For a − σ(1 + a) > 0, f(m) = eH ∀m > 0 and f(m) = −eH ∀m < 0. For
a − σ(1 + a) < 0, f(m) = −eH ∀m > 0 and f(m) = +eH ∀m < 0.
We have shown that, for suﬃciently large values of pF (pF ≥ ˆ pF), separating equilibria
exist where all central-bank types display the same behavior under opacity as under
transparency. Moreover, for suﬃciently small values of pF (pF ≤ p∗
F), pooling equilibria
exist. For somewhat larger pF (p∗
F ≤ pF ≤   pF), semi-separating equilibria occur
in which central banks of types −L and L mimic the behavior of 0. We note that
  pF < ˆ pF cannot be ruled out, as can be readily veriﬁed. Thus it now remains to
describe equilibria for the interval pF ∈]  pF; ˆ pF[. This gap is ﬁlled by the following
proposition:
Proposition 5
Suppose   pF < ˆ pF. For all pF ∈]  pF; ˆ pF[, values φ and φ with 0 < φ < φ < 1 exist such
that for all φ ∈ [φ;φ] separating equilibria exist under opacity that satisfy the following
properties: Central banks of types −H and +H choose mT
−H and mT
H, respectively.
Central banks of types −L and +L choose φmT
−L and φmT
L, respectively. Type 0
chooses mT
0 = 0.
The proof is given in Appendix D. These equilibria are particularly interesting as they
represent fully separating equilibria where the behavior of types −L and L is distorted
by the factor φ over and against the equilibria under transparency. This distortion is
the result of the incentives of types −H and H to mimic the behavior of the types with
moderate shock realizations, i.e. −L and L. As successful imitation may increase the
ﬁrms’ shock estimate, types −L and L choose the distorted money growth rates φmT
−L
and φmT
L respectively, which makes mimicking less attractive for −H and H.
5 Comparison
In this section we compare the central bank’s losses and thus also social losses un-
der transparency with the losses under opacity. The following proposition, proved in
Appendix E, contains the major ﬁnding of this paper:
14Proposition 6
For p < p∗
F, transparency is inferior to opacity. For p > p∗
F, transparency is superior.
Accordingly, whether transparency is desirable depends on the quality of the ﬁrms’
direct information. If ﬁrms are unlikely to be well-informed, transparency is harmful. If
there is a high probability of their being well-informed, then central-bank transparency
is desirable.20
The intuition for this ﬁnding is as follows. If the central bank publishes its private
information, it provides the ﬁrms with information that may be unknown to them. As
it is individually optimal for ﬁrms, albeit socially harmful, to respond to the shock,
publishing information is costly to society. On the other hand, transparency eliminates
the signaling costs the central bank incurs if the money growth rate it would like to
choose under transparency were to signal the wrong information under opacity.
For low-quality information available to ﬁrms (or low levels of pF), the costs incurred by
transparency outweigh the beneﬁts. Loosely speaking, it is better to remain inactive
in this case and to speculate that ﬁrms will not discover the shock realization. By
contrast, if the ﬁrms’ information is high in quality, the ﬁrms are probably informed
anyhow. By publishing its private information the central bank can avoid the signaling
costs.
6 Robustness
In this section we discuss some issues related to the robustness of our ﬁndings. In par-
ticular, we focus on the speciﬁcation of shocks, diﬀerent types of shocks, the additional
restrictions on equilibrium we have introduced under opacity, and the quality of the
central bank’s information.
20Transparency is strictly desirable for pF ∈]p∗
F; ˆ pF[. For pF ≥ ˆ pF, transparency and opacity lead
to equivalent results with respect to welfare if the equilibria speciﬁed in Proposition 3 materialize.
Transparency is strictly superior for all other equilibria.
15Speciﬁcation of shocks In this paper we have focused on four diﬀerent shock real-
izations. This number is suﬃciently high to identify the important signaling incentives
in our framework and at the same time low enough to permit analytical results. If we
considered only one possible realization of a positive and a negative shock (as opposed
to the two in our model), we would ignore the crucial incentive of type H to mimic type
L, which leads to the distortions under opacity driving our results regarding welfare.
By contrast, if we considered more possible realizations of positive and negative shocks,
the signaling incentives and thus the distortions would remain, but the analysis would
be substantially more complex. In particular, with a continuum of potential shock
realizations it is possible to show that pooling equilibria exist under opacity for small
values of pF and fully separating equilibria occur for large values of pF, which is in line
with the analysis in this paper. For intermediate values of pF, equilibria corresponding
to the semi-pooling equilibria in our paper are plausible. However, these would be
extremely laborious to characterize for inﬁnitely many central-bank types.
Other types of shocks In our paper we deliberately focus on cost-push shocks
because we intend to demonstrate that even with these shocks transparency can be
socially desirable. We could introduce demand shocks into our framework, but trans-
parency regarding these shocks would never be socially harmful. Under opacity, sep-
arating equilibria are likely to exist that would perfectly reveal the central bank’s
information. Then transparency and opacity would be equivalent with respect to wel-
fare. Moreover, additional equilibria may exist under opacity, which would deﬁnitely
entail lower welfare levels.21 Consequently, transparency would be desirable from a
welfare point of view.
Quality of the central bank’s information Interestingly, the quality of the central
bank’s information, which is associated with parameter pCB in our model, is irrelevant
for the relative performance of transparency and opacity. Consequently, our ﬁndings
extend to the case where central banks are always informed about cost-push shocks.
21For a detailed analysis, see Hahn (2009).
16Restrictions on equilibrium In Section 4, where we analyze the opacity scenario,
we have introduced two important restrictions on the equilibria under opacity, namely
that f(m) is monotonic and odd. Relaxing these assumptions might allow for addi-
tional equilibria. Although a complete characterization of all additional equilibrium
candidates is beyond the scope of this paper, it is plausible that these equilibria would
lead to higher losses under opacity. For example, an equilibrium where type L chooses
negative values of m under opacity despite mT
L > 0 is likely to be less desirable than
equilibria satisfying our restrictions. Hence relaxing the restrictions on equilibria might
make transparency more attractive over and against opacity.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have considered the impact that the publication of the central bank’s
private information regarding shocks has on welfare. Information about these shocks
induces price-setters to adjust their prices in a socially detrimental way. Consequently,
transparency is harmful from a social welfare perspective if the probability of ﬁrms’
receiving information through alternative sources is low. However, if this probability
is suﬃciently high, transparency is beneﬁcial. Transparency eliminates the signaling
incentives of diﬀerent types of central banks and hence, in turn, the policy distortions
prevalent under opacity.
Interestingly, our model can also be used to rationalize the current trend towards in-
creased transparency in monetary policy. As improvements in information technologies
plausibly raise the probability of economic agents receiving information on the econ-
omy independently of the central bank, it may be increasingly important for central
banks to become more open about their private assessments of the economy.
17A Proof of Proposition 2
A.1 Existence
To show that the proposed equilibrium exists, we have to demonstrate that there is no
proﬁtable deviation for all types τ ∈ T . Before we show this, we note that central-bank
losses can be written in a compact manner with the help of p∗
F (see (11)). Using (9)
and (10), we obtain
L(m
T
e ,EF[ε]) = p
∗
F(EF[ε])




This expression gives the losses the central bank incurs if ﬁrms believe the shock to be
EF[ε] and if the central bank chooses the money growth rate mT
e , which is the choice
that would be optimal under transparency given that ﬁrms would believe the shock to
be e.
Deviations for 0 It is obvious that there is no proﬁtable deviation for 0, as m = 0
is its preferred choice under transparency as well and any other choice would imply
that the public believes a large shock has occurred, which would increase losses further.
It thus remains to show whether proﬁtable deviations exist for the other types. For
simplicity, we focus on the case a−σ(1+a) > 0. In this case, f(m) = eH ∀m > 0 and
f(m) = −eH ∀m < 0 hold. The case with a − σ(1 + a) < 0 is completely analogous
and is therefore omitted.
Deviations for H and -H Now we focus on possible deviations for H. In equilib-
rium, type H’s losses are
pFL(0,EF[ε] = eH) + (1 − pF)L(0,EF[ε] = 0) = pFe
2
H, (14)
where we have utilized (13). It is straightforward to see that for a − σ(1 + a) > 0
any deviation m < 0 is strictly inferior to −m > 0. Thus we consider only deviations
with m > 0 in the following. A deviation m > 0 always results in beliefs EF[ε] = eH.
Consequently, the most proﬁtable of these deviations is mT
H. In line with (13), losses












There is no proﬁtable deviation for H if p∗
Fe2
H ≥ pFe2
H (compare (14) and (15)) or,
equivalently, pF ≤ p∗
F. Due to the symmetry of the ﬁrms’ optimization problem, this
also implies that no proﬁtable deviation exists for −H in this case.
Deviations for L and -L We show next that no proﬁtable deviation exists for
L. Again it suﬃces to examine deviations with m > 0, as any deviation m < 0 is
strictly inferior to −m > 0 for a − σ(1 + a) > 0. Type L’s equilibrium losses are
pFL(0,eL) + (1 − pF)L(0,0) = pFe2
L, while a deviation m with m > 0 entails losses
pFL(m,eL) + (1 − pF)L(m,eH). The most proﬁtable of all deviations is mT
E with
E := pFeL + (1 − pF)eH.22
This deviation will not be attractive if the equilibrium losses are smaller than the losses






E,eL) + (1 − pF)L(m
T
E,eH),
























This inequality always holds, because pFe2
L < pFp∗
Fe2
L + (1 − pF)p∗
Fe2
H for pF ≤ p∗
F.
Hence there is no proﬁtable deviation for L. The demonstration that a proﬁtable
deviation does not exist for −L is completely analogous.
To sum up, no type τ ∈ T has a proﬁtable deviation, and the equilibrium outlined in
the proposition exists.
A.2 Uniqueness
Next, we show that no other equilibria exist. Again we focus on the case a−σ(1+a) > 0
and omit the case with a − σ(1 + a) < 0, which is completely analogous. In line with
22This fact can be easily checked by solving the respective ﬁrst-order condition for m.
19our additional assumptions about f(m), L and H will choose weakly positive values of
m in any equilibrium. Moreover, −L and −H will choose weakly negative values of m.
In addition, the monotonicity of f(m) implies the monotonicity of the central bank’s
decisions as a function of its private estimate of the shock, which can be formally stated







These considerations entail that three constellations are possible with regard to L and
H, in addition to the constellation we have already considered (m = 0 for both). First,
L may choose 0, and H may choose a strictly positive m (0 = mO
L < mO
H). Second,
L may choose a strictly positive value for m that is strictly lower than H’s choice
(0 < mO
L < mO
H). Third, both types may pool (0 < mO
L = mO
H). Therefore uniqueness
can be established by ruling out all three additional constellations.
First we demonstrate that no equilibrium with 0 = mO
L < mO
H exists. As H separates
itself from the other types, f(mO
H) = eH must hold. We have already demonstrated
that H could proﬁtably deviate to m = 0 if mO
H = mT




H, deviating would be even more proﬁtable for pF < p∗
F because mT
H
is the value of m that minimizes H’s losses under the restriction that f(m) = eH.
Second, we consider 0 < mO
L < mO
H. In a fully separating equilibrium, f(mO
L) = eL
and f(mO
H) = eH must hold. Again, H could proﬁtably deviate if pF < p∗
F. Thus no
separating equilibrium exists.
Third, it remains to be shown that semi-separating equilibria with 0 < mO
L = mO
H
can be ruled out. For such an equilibrium f(mO
L) = (ρLeL + ρHeH)/(ρL + ρH) =
2(ρLeL + ρHeH) =: ˆ E > eL must hold. We introduce eO





(compare (10)), i.e. eO
L := [(σ2 + a(1 − σ)2)/(a − σ(1 + a))]mO
L. In line with (13),
type L’s losses in the semi-separating equilibrium would amount to
LL,1 := pFL(m
O
























L − ˆ E)
2
 
For the deviation to m = 0, type L’s losses would be
pFL(m = 0,EF[ε] = eL) = pFe
2
L.
20The equilibrium does not exist if LL,1 > pFe2
L holds ∀eO
L. To show this condition, we
note that pFeL + (1 − pF)ˆ E is the value of eO
L that minimizes LL,1. Evaluating LL,1 at
eO





L + (1 − pF)ˆ E
2)
+ (1 − p
∗
F)(pF(pFeL + (1 − pF)ˆ E − eL)






L + (1 − pF)ˆ E
2)
+ (1 − p
∗
F)(pF(1 − pF)
2(eL − ˆ E)
2 + (1 − pF)p
2






L + (1 − pF)E
2) + (1 − p
∗
F)pF(1 − pF)(eL − ˆ E)
2.
The diﬀerence between LL,1, evaluated at eO
L = pFeL+(1−pF)ˆ E, and the losses incurred
by deviating to m = 0, pFe2





F(1 − pF)ˆ E










This expression is always positive for ˆ E > eL and pF ≤ p∗
F. Consequently, for type L a
proﬁtable deviation always exists, and semi-separating equilibria with 0 < mO
L = mO
H
can be ruled out.
Hence we have established existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium outlined in the
proposition.
2
B Proof of Proposition 3
As a ﬁrst step, we specify beliefs and, in particular, out-of-equilibrium beliefs. We have




      
      
−eH for m < mT
−L
−eL for mT
−L ≤ m < 0
0 for m = 0
+eL for 0 < m ≤ mT
L
+eH for m > mT
L
(16)
21and for a − σ(1 + a) < 0 they are
f(m) =

      
      
eH for m < mT
L
eL for mT
L ≤ m < 0
0 for m = 0
−eL for 0 < m ≤ mT
−L
−eH for m > mT
−L.
For the remainder of the proof we assume a − σ(1 + a) > 0. Adapting the proof to
a−σ(1+a) < 0 is straightforward. In the following, we have to show that no proﬁtable
deviation exists for all types τ ∈ T .
Deviations for 0 It is easy to show that 0 cannot proﬁtably deviate from m = 0.
Even if f(m) = 0 ∀m held, m = 0 would be preferable over and against all m  = 0.
For all m with f(m)  = 0, type 0’s losses would be even higher than in the case where
f(m) = 0 would hold. Thus m = 0 represents the optimal choice for the beliefs deﬁned
in (16).
Deviations for -H and H It suﬃces to consider only possible deviations of H, as
the analysis of type −H’s deviations is completely analogous. It is important to note
that a deviation with m < 0 always leads to higher losses than −m > 0. Thus we focus
on deviations with m > 0.
According to (16), all deviations m with m > mT
L entail f(m) = eH. As mT
H is H’s
optimal choice, conditional on f(m) = eH, these deviations are not proﬁtable.
A deviation to 0 implies f(0) = 0. We note that ˆ pF > p∗
F. Thus pF > ˆ pF implies
pF > p∗
F. According to the proof of Proposition 2, type H therefore prefers mT
H with
f(mT
H) = eH to 0 with f(mT
H) = 0. Hence m = 0 never represents a proﬁtable
deviation.
Finally, we have to check whether deviating to a value of m with 0 < m ≤ mT
L might
yield lower losses to H. For such a deviation, f(m) = eL according to (16). The most
proﬁtable of these deviations is mT
L.23 Thus we need to compare type H’s losses for mT
H
23Conditional on f(m) = eL, m = pFmT
H + (1 − pF)mT
L would minimize losses. Because this value
22with its losses for mT
L. If a central bank of type H chooses mT









By contrast, if H chooses mT
L, its losses will amount to
LH,3 := pFL(m
T
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Rearranging terms and applying e2
H − e2










L) + (1 − p∗






F = ˆ pF.
Hence, if pF ≥ ˆ pF, there is no proﬁtable deviation for H. Otherwise a proﬁtable
deviation exists.
Deviations for -L and L Again we focus on deviations of L with m ≥ 0. According
to the proof of Proposition 2, deviating to m = 0 is not proﬁtable if pF > p∗
F, which
holds because of pF > ˆ pF and ˆ pF > p∗
F. Choosing a value of m from the interval
]0;mT
L[ is never proﬁtable, as this would entail f(m) = eL and mT
L is the value of m
that minimizes type L’s losses contingent on f(m) = eL. It remains to be shown that
L cannot lower its losses by choosing m > mT
L. Such a choice implies f(m) = eH. The
deviation with m > mT
L that yields the lowest losses can be easily computed as mT
E
with E = pFeL + (1 − pF)eH. Following (13), this deviation implies losses
LL,3 := pFL(m
T


















































L + (1 − pF)e
2





of m is strictly larger than mT
L, argminm∈]0;mT
L]{pFL(m,eH) + (1 − pF)L(m,eL)} = mT
L.





















As this inequality always holds, all deviations lead to higher losses for L over and
against the equilibrium losses. Consequently, we have demonstrated that the proposed
equilibrium exists for pF ≥ ˆ pF. For pF < ˆ pF, the equilibrium does not exist because
−H and H can proﬁtably deviate to mT
L in this case.
2
C Proof of Proposition 4
As in previous proofs, we focus on a − σ(1 + a) > 0. The analysis of the case with
a − σ(1 + a) < 0, which is completely analogous, is omitted.
Deviations for 0 Again, no proﬁtable deviation exists for type 0, because m = 0 is
the money growth this type of central bank would also choose under transparency and
any deviation results in beliefs f(m) = eH, which involves even higher costs than the
same deviation would entail for f(m) = 0.
Deviations for H and -H We focus on type H and note that it is straightforward
to extend the analysis to −H. As mT
H is the optimal choice, given that f(m) = eH,
no deviation with m > 0 can ever be proﬁtable. Moreover, we do not have to examine
deviations with m < 0 because −m > 0 would always be strictly more desirable in
these cases. Consequently, we only have to check the deviation m = 0, which involves
f(m) = 0. In the proof of Proposition 2 we have already demonstrated that choosing
m = 0 is not proﬁtable compared to m = mT
H if f(0) = 0, f(mT
H) = eH, and pF ≥ p∗
F.
24Deviations for L and -L Again we omit the analysis of type −L’s deviations. For
type L, deviations with m < 0 are never desirable. The most proﬁtable of all deviations
with m > 0 is pFmT
L + (1 − pF)mT
H. This choice leads to losses LL,3 (see (18)). In
equilibrium, L’s losses are
pFL(0,eL) + (1 − pF)L(0,0) = pFe
2
L.






L + (1 − pF)e
2






This inequality holds for pF = p∗
F and is violated for pF = 1. Moreover, we note that
the diﬀerence between the left-hand side and the right-hand side of the inequality is
quadratic in pF. Consequently, there is a unique value of pF, denoted by   pF (p∗
F <
  pF < 1) such that (19) holds with equality. Hence the proposed equilibrium exists for
p∗
F ≤ pF ≤   pF.
2
D Proof of Proposition 5
As a ﬁrst step, we specify beliefs and, in particular, out-of-equilibrium beliefs. We have




      
      
−eH for m < φmT
−L
−eL for φmT
−L ≤ m < 0
0 for m = 0
+eL for 0 < m ≤ φmT
L
+eH for m > φmT
L
(20)
and for a − σ(1 + a) < 0 they are
f(m) =

      
      
eH for m < φmT
L
eL for φmT
L ≤ m < 0
0 for m = 0
−eL for 0 < m ≤ φmT
−L
−eH for m > φmT
−L.
25For the remainder of the proof we assume a − σ(1 + a) > 0. Adapting the proof to
a−σ(1+a) < 0 is straightforward. In the following, we examine the conditions under
which no proﬁtable deviation exists for all types.
Deviations of -L and L It again suﬃces to study only possible deviations of L, as
the extension of the analysis to type −L’s deviations is straightforward. In equilibrium,
L chooses φmT
L, and the ﬁrms’ beliefs amount to eL, irrespective of whether they have
received direct information or have inferred the size of the shock from the central bank’s











We note that no deviations with 0 < m < φmT




L is the most proﬁtable choice if f(m) = eL. Given f(m) = eH, mT
E with
E = pFeL + (1 − pF)eH is the most proﬁtable option. Hence it is suﬃcient to check
only two candidate deviations, namely 0 and mT
E.
According to (13), deviation 0 involves losses
LL,5 := pFL(0,eL) + (1 − pF)L(0,0) = pFe
2
L






L + (1 − pF)e
2




Interestingly, LL,5 > LL,3 follows from the fact that (19) is violated for pF >   pF. Thus
mT
E represents the most proﬁtable of all deviations, and condition LL,3 ≥ LL,4 alone
guarantees that L cannot proﬁtably deviate.
As a next step, we examine the range of φ for which LL,3 ≥ LL,4 holds. For φ = 0, this
inequality is violated due to (LL,4 = e2
L > LL,5 > LL,3), and for φ = 1 it holds strictly.
Consequently, there is a unique value of φ ∈]0;1[ that satisﬁes LL,3 = LL,4. We use φ
to denote this value. If and only if φ ≥ φ, no proﬁtable deviation exists for L.




H, m = 0 cannot represent a proﬁtable deviation, because pF ≥ p∗
F (compare the
26proof of Proposition 2). No deviation to m > φeL can be proﬁtable. These deviations
imply f(m) = eH, and mT
H is the optimal choice in this case. Given f(m) = eL,
pFmT
H +(1 −pF)mT
L would be optimal, which is larger than φmT
L. Consequently, φmT
L
is the most proﬁtable of all deviations m ∈]0;φmT

























No proﬁtable deviation for H exists if LH,4 ≥ L(mT






H,eH) for φ = 0 and LH,4 < L(mT
H,eH) for φ = 1 (which
follows from pF < ˆ pF). As a result, there is a value of φ ∈]0;1[ with LH,4 = L(mT
H,eH),
which will be denoted by φ. For every φ ≤ φ type H cannot proﬁtably deviate.
Does φ < φ hold? Finally, we have to show φ < φ for all pF ∈]  pF, ˆ pF[. For this
purpose, we demonstrate LH,4 > L(mT
H,eH) at φ = φ.
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= LH,3 + 2pF(1 − p
∗






= LH,3 + 2pF(1 − p
∗





Hence LH,4 > L(mT
H,eH) = p∗
Fe2




(17) and (22), this condition can be easily veriﬁed.
2
27E Proof of Proposition 6
E.1 Case pF < p∗
F
For pF < p∗
F, the statement of the proposition is a direct consequence of the proof of
Proposition 2. There we have shown that each type of bank τ ∈ T \{0} prefers 0 with
f(0) = 0 to mT
τ with f(mT
τ ), provided that pF < p∗
F. Thus each of these central-bank
types has lower losses under opacity than under transparency. Moreover, type 0’s losses
are unaﬀected by the transparency regime. Consequently, expected social losses are
lower under opacity for pF < p∗
F.
E.2 Case pF > p∗
F
The case with pF > p∗
F is more intricate, because the equilibria under opacity are
not unique in general. We proceed by showing that any potential equilibrium under
opacity yields higher losses compared to the transparency solution. While it is unclear
for which parameter constellations these potential equilibria exist (if they exist at all),
we show that, if they existed, they would deﬁnitely lead to higher social losses over
and against the equilibrium under transparency.
First we show that semi-separating equilibria with mO
L = 0 and mO
H > 0 can never be
superior to the transparency solution. In the proof of Proposition 2, we have shown that
type L’s losses are lower for mT
L than for 0 if f(mT
L) = eL, f(0) = 0, and pF > p∗
F. Type
H’s losses can never be lower in a semi-separating equilibrium with mO
L = 0 compared
to transparency, as the money growth chosen under transparency minimizes losses,
given that f(m) = eH. Obviously, losses for type 0 are identical under transparency
and opacity. As losses are weakly higher under opacity for all types and strictly higher
for some, expected social losses are strictly lower under transparency.
Second, we note that the fully separating equilibrium where all central banks choose the
same money growth rates as under transparency is the fully separating equilibrium with
the lowest social losses. Consequently, social losses under transparency are weakly lower
over and against opacity under any fully separating equilibrium. For p∗
F < pF < ˆ pF,
28they are strictly lower under transparency irrespective of which equilibrium is chosen
under opacity. This is a consequence of Proposition 3, which states that equilibria where
all types make the same choices as under transparency do not exist under opacity for
pF < ˆ pF.
Third, it remains to be shown that semi-separating equilibria with 0 < mO
L = mO
H would
yield higher losses compared to the transparency solution. For such a semi-separating
equilibrium f(mO
L) = f(mO
H) = (ρLeL+ρHeH)/(ρL+ρH) = 2(ρLeL+ρHeH) = ˆ E, where
we have utilized ρH + ρL = 1/2. In equilibrium, type L’s losses would amount to
LL,1 = pFL(m
O
L,eL) + (1 − pF)L(m
O
L, ˆ E)
and type H’s losses would be
LH,1 := pFL(m
O
L,eH) + (1 − pF)L(m
O
L, ˆ E).
















A semi-separating equilibrium where L and H pool would yield higher expected social
costs than the transparency solution, if ρL(LL,1−LL,2)+ρH(LH,1−LH,2) > 0 ∀m. It is
straightforward to verify that the value of mO
L that minimizes the left-hand side of this
inequality is mT
ˆ E. Evaluating the left-hand side of the above inequality for this value,
29we obtain
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L − 2eL ˆ E + ˆ E
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H − 2eH ˆ E + ˆ E
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where we have applied (13), ˆ E = 2(ρLeL+ρHeH), and ρL+ρH = 1
2. 2(pF−p∗
F)ρHρL(eH+
eL)2 is positive if pF > p∗
F. Consequently, transparency yields strictly lower losses than
any semi-separating equilibrium that might exist.
To sum up, transparency is strictly superior to opacity for p∗
F < pF < ˆ pF. For pF ≥ ˆ pF,
transparency and opacity will be equivalent with regard to welfare if the equilibrium
outlined in Proposition 3 is chosen. If another equilibrium is chosen, transparency will
be strictly more desirable than opacity from the aggregate welfare perspective.
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